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Abstract
We investigate the properties of Inclusion Logic, that is, First Or-
der Logic with Team Semantics extended with inclusion dependencies.
We prove that Inclusion Logic is equivalent to Greatest Fixed Point
Logic, and we prove that all union-closed first-order definable proper-
ties of relations are definable in it. We also provide an Ehrenfeucht-
Fra¨ısse´ game for Inclusion Logic, and give an example illustrating its
use.
1 Introduction
Inclusion Logic [10], FO(⊆), is a novel logical formalism designed for ex-
pressing inclusion dependencies between variables. It is closely related to
Dependence Logic [24], FO(D), which is the extension of First Order Logic
by functional dependencies between variables. Dependence Logic initially
arose as a variant of Branching Quantifier Logic [13] and of Independence-
Friendly Logic [14, 22], and its study has sparked the development of a whole
family of logics obtained by adding various dependency conditions into First
Order Logic.
All these logics are based on Team Semantics [16, 24] which is a gen-
eralization of Tarski Semantics. In Team Semantics, formulas are satisfied
or not satisfied by sets of assignments, called teams, rather than by sin-
gle assignments. This semantics was introduced in [16] for the purpose of
defining a compositional equivalent for the Game Theoretic Semantics of
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Independence-Friendly Logic [14, 22], but it was soon found out to be of in-
dependent interest. See [9] for a, mostly up-to-date, account of the research
on Team Semantics.
Like Branching Quantifier Logic and Independence-Friendly Logic, De-
pendence Logic has the same expressive power as Existential Second Order
Logic Σ11: every FO(D)-sentence is equivalent to some Σ
1
1-sentence, and vice
versa [24]. The semantics of Dependence Logic is downwards closed in the
sense that if a team X satisfies a formula φ in a model M , then all subteams
Y ⊆ X also satisfy φ in M . The equivalence between FO(D) and Σ11 was ex-
tended to formulas in [19], where it was proved that FO(D) captures exactly
the downwards closed Σ11-definable properties of teams.
Other variants of Dependence Logic that have been studied are Condi-
tional Independence Logic FO(⊥c) [12], Independence Logic FO(⊥) [12, 25],
Exclusion Logic FO( | ) [10] and Inclusion/Exclusion Logic FO(⊆, | ) [10]. All
the logics in this family arise from dependency notions that have been studied
in Database Theory. In particular, FO(D) is based on functional dependen-
cies introduced by Armstrong [1], FO(⊆) is based on inclusion dependencies
[8, 3], FO( | ) is based on exclusion dependencies [4], and FO(⊥) is based on
independence conditions [11].
The expressive power of all these logics, with the exception of FO(⊆),
is well understood. It is known that, with respect to sentences, they are
all equivalent with Σ11. With respect to formulas, FO( | ) is equivalent with
FO(D) [10]; and FO(⊆, | ), FO(⊥c) and FO(⊥) are all equivalent to each
other [10, 25]. Moreover, FO(⊥c) (and hence also FO(⊆, | ) and FO(⊥))
captures all Σ11-definable properties of teams [10].
On the other hand, relatively little is known about the expressive power
of Inclusion Logic, and the main purpose of the present work is precisely to
remedy this. What little is known about this formalism can be found in [10],
and amounts to the following: With respect to formulas, FO(⊆) is strictly
weaker than Σ11 ≡ FO(⊥c) and incomparable with FO(D) ≡ FO( | ). This is
simply because the semantics of FO(⊆) is not downwards closed, but is closed
under unions: if both teams X and Y satisfy a formula φ in a model M , then
X ∪ Y also satisfies φ in M . Moreover, it is known that FO(⊆) is stronger
than First Order Logic over sentences, and that it is contained in Σ11; but it
was an open problem whether it it is equivalent to Σ11, or whether FO(⊆)-
formulas could define all union closed Σ11-definable properties of teams.
In this paper we show that the answer to both of these problems is nega-
tive. In fact, we give a complete characterization for the expressive power of
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FO(⊆) in terms of Positive Greatest Fixed Point Logic GFP+: We prove that
every FO(⊆)-sentence is equivalent to some GFP+-sentence, and vice versa
(Corollary 17). Moreover, we prove that a property of teams is definable by
an FO(⊆)-formula if and only if it is expressible by a GFP+-formula in a
specific way (Theorems 15 and 16).
Fixed point logics have a central role in the area of Descriptive Complex-
ity Theory. By the famous result of Immerman [17] and Vardi [26], Least
Fixed Point Logic LFP captures PTIME on the class of ordered finite mod-
els. Furthermore, it is well known that on finite models, LFP is equivalent
to GFP+. Thus, we obtain a novel characterization for PTIME: a class of
ordered finite models is in PTIME if and only if it is definable by a sentence
of FO(⊆).
In addition to the equivalence with GFP+, we prove that all union-
closed first-order definable properties of teams are definable in Inclusion
Logic (Corollary 26). Thus, it is not possible to increase the expressive
power of FO(⊆) by adding first-order definable union-closed dependencies.
On the other hand, it is an interesting open problem, whether FO(⊆) can
be extended by some natural set D of union-closed dependencies such that
the extension FO(⊆,D) captures all union-closed Σ11-definable properties of
teams.
We also introduce a new Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game that characterizes the
expressive power of Inclusion Logic (Theorem 29). Our game is a modifica-
tion of the EF game for Dependence Logic defined in [24]. Although the EF
game has a clear second order flavour, it is still more manageable than the
usual EF game for Σ11; we illustrate this by describing a concrete winning
strategy for Duplicator in the case of models with empty signature (Propo-
sition 30). Due to the equivalence between FO(⊆) and GFP+ we see that
the EF game for Inclusion Logic is also a novel EF game for GFP+; it is
quite different in structure from the one introduced in [2]. It may be hoped
that this new game and its variants could be of some use for studying the
expressive power of fixed point logics.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Team Semantics
In this section, we will recall the definition of the Team Semantics for First
Order Logic. For simplicity reasons, we will assume that all our expressions
are in negation normal form.
Definition 1 Let M be a first order model and let V be a set of variables.
A team X over M with domain Dom(X) = V is a set of assignments s :
V → Dom(M). Given a tuple ~t = (t1, . . . , tn) of terms with variables in
V and an assignment s ∈ X, we write ~t〈s〉 for the tuple (t1〈s〉, . . . , tn〈s〉),
where t〈s〉 denotes the value of the term t with respect to s in the model M .
Furthermore, we write X(~t) for the relation {~t〈s〉 : s ∈ X}.
A (non-deterministic) choice function for a team X over a set A is a
function H : X → P(A) \ {∅}. The set of all choice functions for X over A
is denoted by C(X,A).
Definition 2 (Team Semantics for First Order Logic1) LetM be a first
order model and let X be a team over it. Then, for all first-order literals α,
variables v, and formulas φ and ψ over the signature of M and with free
variables in Dom(X),
TS-lit: M |=X α iff for all s ∈ X, M |=s α in the usual Tarski Semantics
sense;
TS-∨: M |=X φ ∨ ψ iff X = Y ∪ Z for some Y and Z such that M |=Y φ
and M |=Z ψ;
TS-∧: M |=X φ ∧ ψ iff M |=X φ and M |=X ψ;
TS-∃: M |=X ∃vφ iff there exists a function H ∈ C(X, Dom(M)) such that
M |=X[H/v] ψ, where X [H/v] = {s[m/v] : s ∈ X,m ∈ H(s)};
TS-∀: M |=X ∀vφ iff M |=X[M/v] φ, where X [M/v] = {s[m/v] : s ∈ X,m ∈
Dom(M)}.
The next theorem can be proved by structural induction on φ:
Theorem 3 (Team Semantics and Tarski Semantics) For all first or-
der formulas φ(~v), all models M and all teams X, M |=X φ if and only if
for all s ∈ X, M |=s φ with respect to Tarski Semantics.
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Thus, in the case of First Order Logic it is possible to reduce Team
Semantics to Tarski Semantics. What is then the point of working with the
technically more complicated Team Semantics? As we will see in the next
subsection, the answer is that Team Semantics allows us to extend First
Order Logic in novel and interesting ways.
Note that on every model M , there are two teams with empty domain:
the empty team ∅, and the team {∅} containing the empty assignment ∅.
All the logics that we consider in this paper have the empty team property :
M |=∅ φ for every formula φ and model M . Thus, we say that a sentence φ
is true in a model M if M |={∅} φ. If this is the case, we drop the subscript
{∅}, and write just M |= φ.
2.2 Dependencies in Team Semantics
As we saw, in Team Semantics formulas are satisfied or not satisfied by sets
of assignments, called teams ; and a team corresponds in a natural way to a
relation over the domain of the model. Therefore, any property of relations
can be made to correspond to some property of teams, which we can then
add to our language as a new atomic formula. In particular, we can do
so for database-theoretic dependency notions, thus obtaining the following
generalized atoms :2
Definition 4 (Dependence Atoms) Let ~t1, ~t2, ~t3 be tuples of terms over
some vocabulary. Then, for all models M and all teams X over M whose
domain contains the variables of ~t1~t2~t3,
TS-fdep: M |=X =(~t1,~t2) if and only if, for all s, s
′ ∈ X, ~t1〈s〉 = ~t1〈s
′〉 ⇒
~t2〈s〉 = ~t2〈s
′〉;
TS-exc: For |~t1| = |~t2|, M |=X ~t1 | ~t2 if and only if X(~t1) ∩X(~t2) = ∅;
TS-inc: For |~t1| = |~t2|, M |=X ~t1 ⊆ ~t2 if and only if X(~t1) ⊆ X(~t2);
TS-ind: M |=X ~t1⊥~t2 if and only if for all s, s
′ ∈ X there exists a s′′ ∈ X
with ~t1〈s
′′〉 = ~t1〈s〉 and ~t2〈s
′′〉 = ~t2〈s
′〉;
TS-cond-ind: M |=X ~t2⊥~t1
~t3 if and only if for all s, s
′ ∈ X with ~t1〈s〉 =
~t1〈s
′〉 there exists a s′′ ∈ X with (~t1~t2)〈s
′′〉 = (~t1~t2)〈s〉 and (~t1~t3)〈s
′′〉 =
(~t1~t3)〈s
′〉.
2The notion of “generalized atom” is defined formally in [20].
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These atoms correspond respectively to functional dependencies [1], to
exclusion dependencies [4], to inclusion dependencies [8, 3], to independence
conditions [11], and to conditional independence conditions3; and by adding
them to the language of First Order Logic we can obtain various logics, whose
principal known properties we will now briefly recall.
Dependence Logic FO(D) is obtained by adding functional dependence
atoms to the language of First Order Logic. It is the oldest and the most
studied among the logics that we will discuss in this work, having been
introduced in the seminal book [24] as an alternative approach to the study
of Branching [13] and Independence-Friendly [14, 22] Quantification. It is
downwards closed, in the sense that, for all models M , Dependence Logic
formulas φ and teams X , if M |=X φ then M |=Y φ for all subsets Y of X .
On the level of sentences, Dependence Logic has the same expressive
power as Existential Second Order Logic Σ11.
Theorem 5 ([27, 6, 24]) Every FO(D)-sentence is equivalent to some Σ11-
sentence, and vice versa. In particular, FO(D) captures NP on finite models.
The equivalence between FO(D) and Σ11 was extended to formulas by
Kontinen and Va¨a¨na¨nen, who proved the following characterization:
Theorem 6 ([19]) Let φ be a FO(D)-formula with free variables in ~v. Then
there exists a Σ11-sentence Φ(R), where R is a |~v|-ary relation symbol which
occurs only negatively in Φ, such that
M |=X φ ⇐⇒ (M,X(~v)) |= Φ(R) for all models M and teams X 6= ∅.
Conversely, for any such Φ(R) there exists an FO(D)-formula φ such that
the above holds.
Thus, FO(D) is the strongest logic that can be obtained by adding Σ11-
definable downwards-closed dependence conditions to First-Order Logic. In-
deed, any such condition will be expressible as ∃S(X(~v) ⊆ S ∧ Φ(S)) for
some Φ in Σ11, and therefore it will be equivalent to some FO(D)-formula.
Exclusion Logic FO( | ), on the other hand, is the logic obtained by
adding exclusion atoms to First-Order Logic. It was introduced in [10], where
it was shown to be equivalent to Dependence Logic with respect to formulas.
3As observed in [7], conditional independence atoms also correspond to embedded mul-
tivalued dependencies.
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Conditional Independence Logic FO(⊥c), which was introduced in
[12], adds conditional independence atoms ~t2⊥~t1
~t3 to the language of First
Order Logic. Like FO(D), FO(⊥c) is equivalent to Σ
1
1 with respect to sen-
tences, and also with respect to formulas:
Theorem 7 ([12]) Every FO(⊥c)-sentence is equivalent to some Σ
1
1-sentence,
and vice versa.
Theorem 8 ([10]) A class of relations is definable in Conditional Indepen-
dence Logic if and only if it contains the empty relation and it is Σ11-definable.
Therefore, Conditional Independence Logic is the strongest logic that can be
obtained by adding Σ11-definable dependencies which are true of the empty
relation to First Order Logic. In particular, this implies that every FO(D)
formula (and, therefore, every FO( | ) formula) is equivalent to some FO(⊥c)
formula.4 However, the converse is not true, since FO(⊥c) formulas are not,
in general, downwards closed.
Furthermore, Inclusion/Exclusion Logic FO(⊆, | ) – that is, the logic
obtained by adding inclusion and exclusion dependencies to First Order Logic
– was proved in [10] to be equivalent with FO(⊥c) with respect to formulas.
Finally, Independence Logic FO(⊥) is the logic obtained by adding
only non-conditional dependence atoms ~t1⊥~t2 to First Order Logic. As
proved in [25], Independence Logic and Conditional Independence Logic are
also equivalent with respect to formulas.
Inclusion Logic FO(⊆) is obtained by adding inclusion atoms to First
Order Logic. It is not downwards closed, but it is closed under unions in
the following sense: if φ is an FO(⊆)-formula, M is a model, and Xi, i ∈ I,
are teams on M such that M |=Xi φ for all i ∈ I, then M |=X φ, where
X =
⋃
i∈I Xi. (For a proof, see [10]).
Relatively little is known about the expressive power of FO(⊆), and the
main purpose of the present work is precisely to remedy this. Here we only
recall the following results from [10]:
1. On the level of formulas, FO(⊆) is strictly weaker than FO(⊥c) ≡
FO(⊥) ≡ Σ11, and incomparable with FO(D) ≡ FO( | ).
4This was already shown in [12], in which it was shown that any dependence atom
=(~t1,~t2) is equivalent to the conditional independence atom ~t2⊥~t1
~t2.
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2. The complement of the transitive closure of any first-order formula
φ(~x, ~y) is definable in FO(⊆); hence, FO(⊆) is strictly stronger than
First Order Logic on sentences.
3. On the level of sentences, FO(⊆) is contained in Σ11.
We give next a couple of further examples of the expressive power of
FO(⊆).
Example 9 (a) Consider the sentence φ := ∃x∃y(y ⊆ x ∧ Exy). Let M =
(Dom(M), EM) be a finite model. Then M |= φ if and only if EM contains a
cycle, i.e., there are a0, . . . , an−1 ∈ Dom(M) such that (ai, ai+1) ∈ E
M for all
i < n− 1, and (an−1, a0) ∈ E
M .
The idea here is the following: by the lax semantics, the first existential
quantifier gives a set C of values for x, and the formula ∃y(y ⊆ x ∧ Exy)
then says that for every a ∈ C there is a b ∈ C such that (a, b) ∈ EM .
(b) Let ψ be the FO(⊆)-sentence ∃w(∃u(Pu ∧ u ⊆ w) ∧ ∀u(Ewu →
∃v(Euv∧v ⊆ w))). ThenM |= ψ if and only if player I has a winning strategy
in the following game G(M): Player I starts by choosing some element a0 ∈
PM . In each odd round i + 1, player II chooses an element ai+1 such that
(ai, ai+1) ∈ E
M . In each even round i+ 1, player I chooses an element ai+1
such that (ai, ai+1) ∈ E
M . The first player unable to move according to the
rules, loses the game. Player I wins all infinite plays of the game.
The class K of all finite models M such that player II has a winning
strategy in G(M) is an equivalent to Immerman’s alternating graph accessi-
bility problem, AGAP. It is well known that AGAP is a complete problem
for PTIME with respect to quantifier free reductions ([18]).
2.3 Greatest Fixed Point Logic
Let ψ(R, ~x) be a first-order formula such that the arity of R, ar(R), is equal
to the length k = |~x| of the tuple ~x. If M is a model, then ψ defines an
operation Γ = ΓM,ψ on the set P(Dom(M)
k) of k-ary relations on Dom(M) as
follows:
Γ(P ) := {~a : (M,P ) |=s[~a/~x] ψ(R, ~x)} for each P ∈ P(Dom(M)
k).
A relation P is a fixed point of the operation ΓM,ψ on M if Γ(P ) = P .
Furthermore, P is the greatest fixed point (least fixed point) of ΓM,ψ if Q ⊆ P
(P ⊆ Q, respectively) for all fixed points Q of ΓM,ψ.
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It is well known that if R occurs only positively in ψ, then for every model
M , ΓM,ψ has a greatest fixed point (as well as a least fixed point). Moreover,
the greatest fixed point P of ΓM,ψ has the following characterization: P =⋃
{Q ⊆ Dom(M)k : Q ⊆ ΓM,ψ(Q)} (see, e.g. [21]).
Definition 10 Greatest Fixpoint Logic, GFP, is obtained by adding to First
Order Logic the greatest fixed point operator [gfpR,~xψ(R, ~x)]~t, where R is a
relation variable with ar(R) = |~x|, ψ(R, ~x) is a formula in which R occurs
only positively, and ~t is a tuple of terms with |~t| = |~x|. The semantics of the
operator gfp is defined by the clause:
• M |=s [gfpR,~xψ(R, ~x)]~t if and only if ~t〈s〉 is in the greatest fixed point
of ΓM,ψ.
Positive Greatest Fixed Point Logic, GFP+, is the fragment of Greatest
Fixed Point Logic in which fixed point operators occur only positively.
Least Fixpoint Logic, LFP, similarly, introduces an operator
[lfpR,~xψ(R, ~x)]~t, again for R occurring only positively in ψ, such that M |=
[lfpR,~xψ(R, ~x)]~t if and only if ~t〈s〉 is in the least fixed point of ΓM,ψ.
Fixed point logics have been the object of a vast amount of research,
especially because of their applications in Finite Model Theory and Descrip-
tive Complexity Theory. In particular, Least Fixed Point Logic captures the
complexity class PTIME that consists of all problems that are solvable in
polynomial time:
Theorem 11 ([17, 26]) A class of linearly ordered finite models is definable
in LFP if and only if it can be recognized in PTIME.
Another important result is that on finite models, Greatest Fixed Point
Logic has the same expressive power as Least Fixed Point Logic.
Theorem 12 ([17]) Over finite models, GFP+ (as well as GFP) is equiva-
lent to LFP.
We will also make use of the following normal form result for Positive
Greatest Fixed Point Logic:
Theorem 13 ([23, 17]) Every GFP+-sentence φ is equivalent to a GFP+-
sentence of the form ∃~z [gfpR,~x ψ(R, ~x)]~z, where ψ is a first-order formula.
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3 Inclusion Logic captures GFP+
We will now prove that Inclusion Logic has exactly the same expressive power
as Positive Greatest Fixed Point Logic. Since the semantics of GFP+ is
defined in terms of single assignments instead of teams, the equivalence of
FO(⊆) and GFP+ on formulas has to be formulated in a bit indirect way;
see Theorems 15 and 16 below.
We start with a lemma that connects teams and the greatest fixed point
operator:
Lemma 14 Let ψ(S, ~x) a GFP+-formula with free variables in
~x = (x1, . . . , xn) such that S is n-ary and occurs only positively in ψ, let M
be a model, and let Y a team on M .
(a) If (M,Y (~x)) |=s ψ(S, ~x) for all s ∈ Y , then M |=s [gfpS,~x ψ(S, ~x)]~x for
all s ∈ Y .
(b) If Y is a maximal team such that M |=s [gfpS,~x ψ(S, ~x)]~x for all s ∈ Y ,
then (M,Y (~x)) |=s ψ(S, ~x) for all s ∈ Y .
Proof. Note that (M,Y (~x)) |=s ψ(S, ~x) for all s ∈ Y if and only if Y (~x) ⊆
ΓM,ψ(Y (~x)). Thus, claim (a) follows from the fact that the greatest fixed
point of ΓM,ψ is the union of all relations Q such that Q ⊆ ΓM,ψ(Q). Claim
(b) follows from the observation that if Y is a maximal team such that
M |=s [gfpS,~x ψ(S, ~x)]~x for all s ∈ Y , then Y (~x) is the greatest fixed point of
ΓM,ψ.
We will next prove that every FO(⊆)-formula can be expressed in GFP+.
Theorem 15 For every FO(⊆)-formula φ(~x) with free variables in ~x =
(x1, . . . , xn) there is a GFP
+-formula φ∗ = φ∗(R, ~x) such that ar(R) = |~x|,
R occurs only positively in φ∗, and the condition
M |=X φ(~x) ⇐⇒ (M,X(~x)) |=s φ
∗(R, ~x) for all s ∈ X
holds for all models M and teams X with Dom(X) = {x1, . . . , xn}.
Proof. The proof is by structural induction on φ.
1. If φ(~x) is a first-order literal, let φ∗(R, ~x) be just φ(~x). Then we have
M |=X φ(~x) ⇐⇒ M |=s φ(~x) for all s ∈ X
⇐⇒ (M,X(~x)) |=s φ(~x) for all s ∈ X.
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2. If φ(~x) is an inclusion atom ~t1 ⊆ ~t2, let φ
∗(R, ~x) be ∃~z(R~z ∧ ~t1(~x) =
~t2(~z)), where ~z is a tuple of new variables. Note that (M,X(~x)) |=h
~t1(~x) = ~t2(~z) for an assignment h defined on ~x~z if and only if there
are two assignments s, s′ defined on ~x such that ~t1〈s〉 = ~t2〈s
′〉 and
h = s ∪ (s′ ◦ f), where f is the function f(zi) = xi. Thus, we see that
(M,X(~x)) |=s φ
∗(R, ~x) for all s ∈ X if and only if for every s ∈ X
there is an s′ ∈ X such that ~t1〈s〉 = ~t2〈s
′〉, as desired.
3. Assume next that φ(~x) is of the form ψ(~x) ∨ θ(~x). Then we define
φ∗(R, ~x) := [gfpS,~x (R~x ∧ ψ
∗(S, ~x))]~x ∨ [gfpT,~x (R~x ∧ θ
∗(T, ~x))]~x.
If M |=X φ(~x), then there are teams Y and Z such that X = Y ∪ Z,
M |=Y ψ(~x) and M |=Z φ(~x). By induction hypothesis, (M,Y (~x)) |=s
ψ∗(S, ~x), and consequently (M,X(~x), Y (~x)) |=s R~x∧ψ
∗(S, ~x), holds for
all s ∈ Y . Hence, by Lemma 14, (M,X(~x)) |=s [gfpS,~x (R~x∧ψ
∗(S, ~x))]~x
holds for all s ∈ Y .
In the same way we see that (M,X(~x)) |=s [gfpT,~x (R~x ∧ θ
∗(T, ~x))]~x
holds for all s ∈ Z. Thus, we conclude that (M,X(~x)) |=s φ
∗(R, ~x) for
all s ∈ X .
To prove the converse, assume that (M,X(~x)) |=s φ
∗(R, ~x) for all s ∈
X . Let Y be the set of all assignments s ∈ X that satisfy the first
disjunct of φ∗(R, ~x), and let Z be the set of assignments s ∈ X that
satisfy the second disjunct. Then Y is the maximal team such that,
for all s ∈ Y , (M,X(~x)) |=s [gfpS,~x (R~x ∧ ψ
∗(S, ~x))]~x. It follows from
Lemma 14 that (M,X(~x), Y (~x)) |=s R~x∧ψ
∗(S, ~x) for all s ∈ Y . Thus,
(M,Y (~x)) |=s ψ
∗(S, ~x) for all s ∈ Y , and by induction hypothesis,
M |=Y ψ(~x). In the same way we see that M |=Z θ(~x). Finally, since
X = Y ∪ Z, we conclude that M |=X φ(~x).
4. If φ(~x) = ψ(~x)∧ θ(~x), we define simply φ∗(R, ~x) := ψ∗(R, ~x)∧ θ∗(R, ~x).
The claim follows then directly from the induction hypothesis.
5. If φ(~x) is of the form ∃v ψ(~xv), let φ∗(R, ~x) be
∃v[gfpS,~xv (R~x ∧ ψ
∗(S, ~xv))]~xv
. ThenM |=X φ(~x) if and only if there is a function H ∈ C(X, Dom(M))
such that M |=Y ψ(~xv), where Y = X [H/v]. By the induction hypoth-
esis, this is equivalent to (M,Y (~xv)) |=h ψ
∗(S, ~xv) being true for all
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h ∈ Y . This, in turn, is equivalent with the condition
(M,X(~x), Y (~xv)) |=h R~x ∧ ψ
∗(S, ~xv) for all h ∈ Y . (1)
If condition (1) holds, then by Lemma 14, (M,X(~x)) |=h [gfpS,~xv (R~x∧
ψ∗(S, ~xv))]~xv holds for all h ∈ Y . Since every s ∈ X has an extension
h ∈ Y , it follows that (M,X(~x)) |=s φ
∗(R, ~x) for all s ∈ X .
On the other hand, if (M,X(~x)) |=s φ
∗(R, ~x) for all s ∈ X , we define
H ∈ C(X, Dom(M)) to be the function such that
H(s) := {a ∈ Dom(M) : (M,X(~x)) |=s[a/v] [gfpS,~xv (R~x∧ψ
∗(S, ~xv))]~xv},
and let Y = X [H/v]. Then Y is the maximal team such that
(M,X(~x)) |=h [gfpS,~xv (R~x ∧ ψ
∗(S, ~xv))]~xv
for all h ∈ Y , whence condition (1) follows from Lemma 14.
6. If φ(~x) is of the form ∀v ψ(~xv), let φ∗(R, ~x) be
∀v[gfpS,~xv (R~x ∧ ψ
∗(S, ~xv))](~xv).
The proof of the claim is similar to the case of existential quantification.
In proving that GFP+-sentences can be expressed in FO(⊆) we will use
the normal form given in Theorem 13. Thus, it suffices to find translations
for first-order formulas, and formulas obtained by a single application of the
gfp-operator to first-order formulas.
Theorem 16 Let η(R, ~x, ~y) be a first-order formula such that R occurs only
positively in η, ar(R) = |~x| = n, and the free variables of η are in ~x~y.
(a) There exists an FO(⊆)-formula η+(~x, ~y) such that for all models M and
teams X on M
M |=X η
+(~x, ~y) ⇐⇒ (M,X(~x)) |=s η(R, ~x, ~y) for every s ∈ X
(b) If ~y is empty, and ~z is an n-tuple of variables not occurring in η, then
there exists an FO(⊆)-formula η˜(~z) such that for all models M and
teams X on M
M |=X η˜(~z) ⇐⇒ M |=s [gfpR,~x η(R, ~x)]~z for every s ∈ X
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Proof. (a) We prove the claim by structural induction on η.
1. If η(R, ~x, ~y) is a first-order literal not containing the relation symbol
R, we define η+ := η. Then M |=X η
+ if and only if M |=s η for
every s ∈ X . Since R does not occur in η, this is equivalent with
(M,X(~x)) |=s η for all s ∈ X , as required.
2. If η is of the form R~t, we define η+(~x, ~y) := ~t ⊆ ~x. Then we have
M |=X η
+(~x, ~y) ⇐⇒ ∀s ∈ X ∃s′ ∈ X : ~t〈s〉 = ~x〈s′〉
⇐⇒ ∀s ∈ X : ~t〈s〉 ∈ X(~x)
⇐⇒ ∀s ∈ X : (M,X(~x)) |=s R~t.
3. If η is of the form α(R, ~x, ~y)∨β(R, ~x, ~y), let ~u = (u1, . . . , un) be a tuple
of new variables and let η+(~x, ~y) be the formula
∃~u
(
(~u ⊆ ~x) ∧ (α+(~u, ~x~y) ∨ β+(~u, ~x~y))
)
.
Here we assume as induction hypothesis that M |=Y α
+(~u, ~x~y) if and
only if (M,Y (~u)) |=h α(R, ~x, ~y) for all h ∈ Y , and similarly for β
+(~u, ~x~y)
and β(R, ~x, ~y).
Suppose first that M |=X η
+(~x, ~y). Then there is a function H ∈
C(X, Dom(M)n) such thatX [H/~u](~u) ⊆ X(~x), and furthermore, X [H/~u]
can be split into two subteams Y and Z such that M |=Y α
+(~u, ~x~y)
and M |=Z β
+(~u, ~x~y). Now take any s ∈ X and let h ∈ X [H/~u]
be an extension of s. If h ∈ Y then (M,Y (~u)) |=h α(R, ~x, ~y). Since
Y (~u) ⊆ X [H/~u](~u) ⊆ X(~x), ~x~y〈h〉 = ~x~y〈s〉 and R occurs only posi-
tively in α, we have (M,X(~x)) |=s α(R, ~x, ~y). Similarly, if h ∈ Z then
(M,X(~x)) |=s β(R, ~x, ~y). Thus, (M,X(~x)) |=s α(R, ~x, ~y) ∨ β(R, ~x, ~y)
for all s ∈ X , as required.
Conversely, suppose that for any s ∈ X , (M,X(~x)) |=s α(R, ~x, ~y) ∨
β(R, ~x, ~y). Now let H ∈ C(X, Dom(M)n) be the function such that
H(s) = X(~x) for all s ∈ X . Note first that clearly M |=X[H/~u] ~u ⊆ ~x.
Let Y = {h ∈ X [H/~u] : (M,X(~x)) |=h α(R, ~x, ~y)} and Z = {h ∈
X [H/~u] : (M,X(~x)) |=h β(R, ~x, ~y)}. By hypothesis, X [H/~u] = Y ∪ Z.
If Y 6= ∅, then Y (~u) = X [H/~u](~u) = X(~x): indeed, if (M,X(~x)) |=h
α(R, ~x, ~y) then the same holds for all h′ which differ from h only with
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respect to ~u, since ~u is not free in α. Therefore (M,Y (~u)) |=h α(R, ~x, ~y)
for all h ∈ Y , and thus M |=Y α
+(~u, ~x~y). If instead Y = ∅, then
M |=Y α
+(~u, ~x~y) trivially. Similarly, M |=Z β
+(~u, ~x~y), and therefore
M |=X[H/~u] α
+(~u, ~x~y) ∨ β+(~u, ~x~y), whence the function H witnesses
that M |=X η
+.
4. If η is α(R, ~x, ~y) ∧ β(R, ~x, ~y), let η+(~x, ~y) be α+(~x, ~y) ∧ β+(~x, ~y). Then
the claim follows directly from the induction hypothesis.
5. If η(R, ~x, ~y) is ∃v α(R, ~x, ~yv), let η+(~x, ~y) be ∃v α+(~x, ~yv); here we as-
sume w.l.o.g. that v is not among the variables in ~x~y. Then M |=X
η+(~x, ~y) if and only if there is a function H ∈ C(X, Dom(M)) such that
M |=X[H/v] α
+(~x, ~yv). Since X [H/v](~x) = X(~x), by induction hypoth-
esis this is equivalent with the condition
(M,X(~x)) |=h α(R, ~x, ~yv) holds for all h ∈ X [H/v]. (2)
If condition (2) is true, then clearly (M,X(~x)) |=s η(R, ~x, ~y) for all
s ∈ X . Conversely, if (M,X(~x)) |=s η(R, ~x, ~y) holds for all s ∈ X ,
then (2) is true for the function H such that H(s) = {a ∈ Dom(M) :
(M,X(~x)) |=s[a/v] α(R, ~x, ~yv)}.
6. If η(~R, ~x, ~y) is ∀v α(~R, ~x, ~yv), let η+(~x, ~y) be ∀v α+(~x, ~yv). The proof
of the claim is similar as in the previous case.
(b) Let ~z be an n-tuple of variables not occurring in η. We define η˜(~z)
to be the formula ∃~x(~z ⊆ ~x ∧ η+(~x)), where η+ is the FO(⊆)-formula corre-
sponding to η(R, ~x), as given in claim (a). Suppose first that M |=X η˜(~z).
Then there is a function H ∈ C(X, Dom(M)n) such that M |=Y η
+(~x), and
~z〈h〉 ∈ Y (~x) for all h ∈ Y , where Y = X [H/~x]. Thus, by claim (a),
(M,Y (~x)) |=h η(R, ~x) holds for all h ∈ Y . It follows now from Lemma 14 that
M |=h [gfpR,~x η(R, ~x)]~x for all h ∈ Y . Since every s ∈ X has an extension
h ∈ Y , and ~z〈s〉 = ~z〈h〉 ∈ Y (~x), we conclude that M |=s [gfpR,~x η(R, ~x)]~z for
all s ∈ X .
To prove the converse, assume that M |=s [gfpR,~x η(R, ~x)]~z for all s ∈ X .
Let P be the greatest fixed point of the formula η(R, ~x) (with respect to R and
~x) on the model M , and let H ∈ C(X, Dom(M)n) be the function such that
H(s) = P for every s ∈ X . Let Y = X [H/~x]. Then (M,Y (~x)) |=h η(R, ~x)
for all h ∈ Y , whence by claim (a), we have M |=Y η
+(~x). Moreover,
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~z〈h〉 ∈ Y (~x) = P for all h ∈ H , whence M |=Y ~z ⊆ ~x. Thus, the function H
witnesses that M |=X ∃~x(~z ⊆ ~x ∧ η
+(~x)).
Note that in the case of disjunction above, it was necessary to “store” the
possible values of ~x into the values of a new tuple ~u of variables: otherwise,
by splitting the team X into two subteams we could have lost information
about X(~x).
The equivalence of FO(⊆) and GFP+ for sentences follows now from the
two theorems above:
Corollary 17 For any FO(⊆)-sentence φ there exists an equivalent GFP+-
sentence θ, and vice versa.
Proof. If φ is an FO(⊆)-sentence, then by Theorem 15, there is a formula
φ∗(R, x) such that for all models M and teams X , M |=X φ if and only if
(M,X(x)) |=s φ
∗(R, x) for all s ∈ X . Thus, M |= φ if and only if M |=
∀x [gfpR,x φ
∗(R, x)]x.
On the other hand, if ψ is a GFP+-sentence, then by Theorem 13, we
can assume that it is of the form ∃~z [gfpR,~x η(R, ~x)]~z, where η is a first-order
formula. It follows now from Theorem 16(b) that ψ is equivalent to the
FO(⊆)-sentence ∃~z η˜(~z).
Corollary 18 A class of linearly ordered finite models is definable in FO(⊆)
if and only if it can be recognized in PTIME.
This connection between Inclusion Logic, Fixed Point Logic and descrip-
tive complexity may be of great value for the further development of the area.
In particular, it implies that fragments and extensions of FO(⊆) can be made
to correspond to various fragments and extensions of PTIME. Hence, results
concerning their relationships may lead to insights which may be valuable in
complexity theory, and vice versa.
4 First-Order Union Closed Properties
From Corollary 17 it follows immediately that Inclusion Logic is strictly
weaker than Σ11. As an immediate consequence, not all Σ
1
1-definable union-
closed properties of relations can be expressed in Inclusion Logic. For exam-
ple, consider the atom
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TS-R: M |= R(xyzw) if and only if there exist two functions
f, g : Dom(M)→ Dom(M)
such that, for all a, b ∈ Dom(M),
(a, f(a), b, g(b)) ∈ X(xyzw).
It is easy to see that the atom R is union-closed. On the other hand,
it can be seen that that the sentence ∀x∃y∀z∃w(R(xyzw) ∧ (x = z ↔ y =
w) ∧ (y = z → x = w) ∧ x 6= y) holds in a finite model if and only if it
contains an even number of elements. Since even cardinality is not definable
in GFP, it follows that R is not definable in FO(⊆).
But what about first order definable union-closed properties? As we
will now see, all such properties are indeed definable in Inclusion Logic; and
therefore, it is not possible to increase the expressive power of Inclusion Logic
by adding any first order definable union-closed dependency.
Definition 19 A sentence φ(R) is myopic if it is of the form ∀~x(R~x →
θ(R, ~x)) for some first-order formula θ in which R occurs only positively.
It follows at once from Theorem 16 that myopic sentences correspond to
Inclusion Logic-definable properties:
Proposition 20 Let φ(R) = ∀~x(R~x→ θ(R, ~x)) be a myopic sentence. Then
there exists an FO(⊆)-formula φ+(~x) such that, for all models M and teams
X,
M |=X φ
+(~x) if and only if (M,X(~x)) |= φ(R).
Proof. Consider θ(R, ~x): by Theorem 16, there exists an FO(⊆)-formula
θ+(~x) such that for all models M and teams X ,
M |=X θ
+(~x) ⇐⇒ ∀s ∈ X : (M,X(~x)) |=s θ(R, ~x)
⇐⇒ (M,X(~x)) |= ∀~x(R~x→ θ(R, ~x)),
as required.
It is also easy to see that all myopic properties are union-closed. We will
now prove the converse implication: if φ(R) is a first order sentence that
defines a union-closed property of relations, then it is equivalent to some
myopic sentence. From this preservation theorem it will follow at once that
all union-closed first-order properties of relations are definable in Inclusion
Logic.
First, let us recall some model-theoretic machinery:
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Definition 21 (ω-big models) A model A of signature Σ is ω-big if for
all finite tuples ~a of elements of it and for all models (B,~b, S) such that
(A,~a) ≡ (B,~b) there exists a relation P over A such that (A,~a, P ) ≡ (B,~b, S).
Definition 22 (ω-saturated models) A model A is ω-saturated if for ev-
ery finite set C of elements of A, all complete 1-types over C with respect to
A are realized in A.
The proofs of the following model-theoretic results can be found in [15].
Theorem 23 ([15], Theorem 8.2.1) Let A be a model. Then A has an
ω-big elementary extension.
Theorem 24 ([15], Lemma 8.3.4) Let A and B be ω-saturated structures
over a finite signature and such that, for all sentences χ(R) in which R occurs
only positively,
A |= χ(R) =⇒ B |= χ(R).
Then there are elementary substructures C and D of A and B and a bijective
homomorphism f : C → D which fixes all relation symbols except R.
Theorem 25 (Essentially [15], Theorem 8.1.2) Suppose that A is ω-big
and ~a is a finite tuple of elements. Then (A,~a) is ω-saturated.
Using these results, we can prove our representation theorem:
Theorem 26 Let φ(R) be a first order sentence that defines a union-closed
property of R. Then φ is equivalent to some myopic sentence. Consequently,
every first-order definable union-closed property of relations is definable in
FO(⊆).
Proof. Let T = {φ′(R) : φ′(R) is myopic, φ(R) |= φ′(R)}. If we can show
that T |= φ(R), we are done: indeed, by compactness this implies that φ
is equivalent to a finite conjunction ∀~x(R~x → θ1(R, ~x)) ∧ . . . ∧ ∀~x(R~x →
θn(R, ~x)) of myopic sentences, which of course is equivalent to ∀~x(R~x →
(θ1(R, ~x) ∧ . . . ∧ θn(R, ~x))).
So, let B′ be a model satisfying T , and let B be an ω-big extension of B′.
We need to show that B |= φ(R) (and, therefore, B′ |= φ(R)).
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Now choose an arbitrary tuple ~b of elements such that B |= R~b, and let
Γ be the theory
Γ = {R~a, φ(R)} ∪ {ψ(R,~a) : R only negative in ψ,B |= ψ(R,~b)}.
Γ is satisfiable: indeed, if it were not then by compactness there would be
formulas ψ1(R, ~x), . . . , ψn(R, ~x) in which R occurs only negatively such that
φ(R) |= ∀~x
(
R~x→
∨
1≤i≤n
¬ψi(R, ~x)
)
.
But this is a myopic formula, and therefore it would have to hold in B, which
is a contradiction since B |= ψi(R,~b) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Now let (A,~a) be an ω-saturated model of Γ. If R occurs only positively
in χ(R, ~x) and A |= χ(R,~a), then B |= χ(R,~b); otherwise ¬χ(R,~a) would be
in Γ. Furthermore, since B is ω-big, (B,~b) is ω-saturated. Thus, there are
elementary substructures (C,~a) and (D,~b) of (A,~a) and (B,~b) and a bijective
homomorphism f : C → D that fixes all relations except R.
Let S = f(RC). Then S ⊆ RD, since f is an homomorphism; and f is
actually an isomorphism between (C,~a) and (D[S/R],~b), since f fixes even
R between these two models. Now, C |= R~a∧ φ(R), whence D |= S~b∧ φ(S).
Furthermore, since S ⊆ R we have that D |= ∀~x(S~x→ R~x).
Now, (D,~b) is an elementary substructure of (B,~b) and B is a ω-big
model: therefore, there exists a relation P over B such that (D,~b, S) ≡
(B,~b, P ). In particular, this implies that B |= P~b ∧ φ(P ) ∧ P ⊆ R: there is
a subset of RB which contains ~b and satisfies φ.
But we chose ~b as an arbitrary tuple in RB. So we have that RB is the
union of a family of relations P~b, where
~b ranges over RB; and B |= φ(P~b) for
all such ~b. Since φ(R) is closed under unions, this implies that B |= φ(R), as
required.
5 An EF Game for Inclusion Logic
We will now define an Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game for Inclusion Logic. This
game is an obvious variant of the one defined in [24] for Dependence Logic:
Definition 27 Let A and B be two models over the same signature, let n ∈
N, and let X and Y be two teams with the same domain over A and B,
respectively. Then the two-player game Gn(A,X,B, Y ) is defined as follows:
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1. The initial position p0 is (X, Y );
2. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let pi−1 be (Xi−1, Yi−1). Then Spoiler makes a
move of one of the following types:
Splitting: Spoiler chooses two teams X ′, X ′′ such that Xi−1 = X
′∪X ′′.
Then Duplicator chooses two teams Y ′, Y ′′ such that Yi−1 = Y
′ ∪
Y ′′. Then Spoiler chooses whether the next position pi is (X
′, Y ′)
or (X ′′, Y ′′).
Supplementing: Spoiler chooses a variable v and a function H :
Xi−1 → P(Dom(A))\{∅}. Then Duplicator chooses a function
K : Yi−1 → P(Dom(B))\{∅}, and the new position pi is
(Xi−1[H/v], Yi−1[K/v]).
Duplication: Spoiler chooses a variable v. The next position pi is
(Xi−1[A/v], Yi−1[B/v]).
3. The final position pn = (Xn, Yn) is winning for Spoiler if and only
if there exists a formula α which is either a first-order literal, or an
inclusion atom, such that A |=Xn α, but B 6|=Yn α. Otherwise, the final
position is winning for Duplicator.
The rank of an Inclusion Logic formula is also defined much in the same way
as the rank of a Dependence Logic formula:
Definition 28 Let φ be an FO(⊆)-formula. Then we define its rank rk(φ) ∈
N by structural induction on φ, as follows:
1. If φ is a first-order literal or an inclusion atom, rk(φ) = 0;
2. rk(ψ ∧ θ) = max(rk(ψ), rk(θ));
3. rk(ψ ∨ θ) = max(rk(ψ), rk(θ)) + 1;
4. rk(∃vψ) = rk(∀vψ) = rk(ψ) + 1.
The next theorem shows that our games behave as required with respect
to our notion of rank. Its proof is practically the same as for the EF game
for FO(D) in [24].
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Theorem 29 Let A and B be models and X and Y teams on A and B.
Then Duplicator has a winning strategy in Gn(A,X,B, Y ) if and only if
A |=X φ =⇒ B |=Y φ
holds for all FO(⊆)-formulas φ with rk(φ) ≤ n.
Due to the equivalence between FO(⊆) and GFP+ we can conclude at
once that the EF game for Inclusion Logic is also a novel EF game for GFP+,
rather different in structure from the one introduced in [2]. It may be hoped
that this new game and its variants could be of some use for studying the
expressive power of fixed point logics.
Although the EF game for Inclusion Logic has a clear second order flavour,
it is still manageable: we will next show that Duplicator has a concrete
winning strategy, when the models are simple enough.
Proposition 30 Let A = {1, . . . , n} and B = {1, . . . , n + 1} be two finite
models over the empty signature. Then for all FO(⊆)-sentences φ of rank
≤ n,
A |= φ =⇒ B |= φ.
Proof. It suffices to specify a winning strategy for Duplicator in the game
Gn(A, {∅}, B, {∅}). Our aim for such a strategy is to preserve the following
property for n turns:
• If the current position is (X, Y ) then
Y =
⋃
{π[X ] : π ∈ I(A,B)}, (3)
where I(A,B) is the set of all 1-1 functions A→ B, π[X ] = {π(s) : s ∈ X}
and π(s) denotes the assignment π ◦ s.
The property (3) is trivially true for ({∅}, {∅}). Furthermore, as long as
(3) holds, Spoiler does not win. Indeed, if α is a first-order literal such that
A |=s α for all s ∈ X , then, since all s
′ ∈ Y are of the form π(s) for some
s ∈ X and the signature is empty, we have B |=s′ α for all s
′ ∈ Y . Similarly,
suppose that A |=X ~u ⊆ ~w, and let s
′ ∈ Y . Then s′ = π(s) for some s ∈ X
and some π ∈ I(A,B), and there exists a h ∈ X such that ~u〈s〉 = ~w〈h〉. But
then π(h) ∈ Y , and ~w〈π(h)〉 = ~u〈π(s)〉 = ~u〈s′〉, as required.
Thus, we only need to verify that Duplicator can maintain property (3)
for n rounds. Suppose that at round i < n the current position (X, Y ) has
property (3), and let us consider the possible moves of Spoiler:
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Splitting: Suppose that Spoiler splits X into X1 and X2. Then let Dupli-
cator reply by splitting Y into Yj =
⋃
{s′ ∈ Y : ∃π ∈ I(A,B)∃s ∈
Xj such that π(s) = s
′} for j ∈ {1, 2}. Then Y = Y1 ∪ Y2, and it
is straightforward to check that both possible successors (X1, Y1) and
(X2, Y2) have property (3).
Supplementing: Suppose that Spoiler chooses a function H ∈ C(X,A).
Then let Duplicator reply with the function K ∈ C(Y,B) defined as
K(s′) =
⋃
{π(a) : ∃π ∈ I(A,B)∃s ∈ X such that π(s) = s′ and
a ∈ H(s)}
for each s′ ∈ Y . We leave it to the reader to verify that the next
position (X [H/v], Y [K/v]) has property (3).
Duplication: If Spoiler chooses a duplication move, the next position is
(X [M/v], Y [M/v]). We check that this new position satisfies property
(3).
Let s[a/v] ∈ X [A/v] and let π ∈ I(A,B). Since s ∈ X , we have that
π(s) ∈ Y , and therefore π(s)[b/v] = π(s[a/v]) ∈ Y [B/v].
Conversely, let s′ ∈ Y and let b be any element of B. We need to show
that s′[b/v] = π(s[a/v]) for some π ∈ I(A,B), s ∈ X and a ∈ Dom(A).
By induction hypothesis, there exists π ∈ I(A,B) and s ∈ X such that
π(s) = s′. If b is in the range of π, then s′[b/v] = π(s[a/v]), where
a = π−1(b). On the other hand, if b is not in the range of π, then
since i < n, there is an element a ∈ A which is not in the range of s.
Now s[a/v] ∈ X [A/v], and s′[b/v] = π′(s[a/v]), where π′ ∈ I(A,B) is a
function such that π′(a) = b and π′(c) = π(c) for all c in the range of
s.
From Proposition 30 it immediately follows that even cardinality (and other
similar cardinality properties) of finite models is not definable in Inclusion
Logic. This, of course, follows already from the equivalence of FO(⊆) and
GFP+, as it is well-known that non-trivial cardinality properties are not
definable in fixed point logics.
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6 Conclusions and Further Work
In this work, we proved a number of results concerning the expressive power
of inclusion Logic. We showed that this logic is strictly weaker than Σ11, and
corresponds in fact to Positive Greatest Fixed Point Logic. Furthermore, we
showed that all union-closed first-order properties of relations correspond to
the satisfaction conditions of Inclusion Logic formulas, and we also defined
a new Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game for it.
Due to the connection between Inclusion Logic and fixed point logics,
the study of this formalism may have interesting applications in descriptive
complexity theory. In [5], Durand and Kontinen established some corre-
spondences between fragments of Dependence Logic and fragments of NP; in
the same way, one may hope to find correspondences between fragments of
Inclusion Logic and fragments of PTIME.
Furthermore, we may inquire about extensions of Inclusion Logic. For
example, is there any natural union-closed dependency notion D such that
FO(⊆,D) defines all Σ11 union-closed properties of relations? By the results
in Section 4, we know that if this is the case, then D is not first-order.
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